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THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY AND THE PLACE OF
RELIGIOUS CONVICTION: PROTECTING ANIMALS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
KENT GREENAWALT*

I. INTRODUCTION

When people hold religious views that have implications for
moral choices and for the desirable uses of law, may they properly
rely on those religious views in our liberal democracy9 The commonly expressed ideas that church and state are separate and that
no group should impose its religious views on others may seem to
suggest that political dialogue and bases for political decisions
should be wholly nonreligious. This position, which is the main target of this Article, receives articulate defense among prominent social philosophers. This Article urges a different position: that no
commonly shared ground of decision is available for many issues,
and that people should feel as free to rely on religious perspectives
as on other perspectives that help determine political positions.
After setting out the position that liberal democracy requires decisions based on rational and secular grounds, I introduce the subjects of animal rights and environmental policy to illustrate my
thesis. I suggest that the capacity of rational secular thought to
deal with these subjects is limited, and argue that no sensible basis
exists for excluding religious bases for judgment about them.
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University.
This Article represents an expanded part of a broader treatment of religious convictions
and lawmaking that was developed for a series of Cooley lectures delivered in March 1986 at

the University of Michigan Law School, and published as Greenawalt, Religious Convictions
and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352 (1985). A more expansive version of these lectures

will be published as a book called Religious Convictions and Political Choice by Oxford
University Press in late 1987. Another article drawn from this work, entitled Religiously
Based Premises and Laws Restrictive of Liberty, appears 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 245.

My study of this subject has been aided substantially by a 1985 summer research grant
from the Samuel Rubin Foundation. I also have profited greatly from my stay at the

Marshall-Wythe School of Law as Lee Visiting Professor of Law. The cordial atmosphere,
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These comments lead to a more abstract exploration of the nature
of religious convictions and why those convictions should be classified among a larger category of nonrational bases for judgment.
This exploration exposes deeply troubling questions about the
boundaries of rationality. Despite all its uncertainties and incompleteness, however, the exploration lays the groundwork for the
straightforward claim that religious grounds for decision should
not be regarded by liberals as inferior in status to the only other
bases for political decision that often are available.
II. THE POSITION THAT CITIZENS SHOULD RELY ON NONRELIGIOUS
JUDGMENTS

The idea that citizens and officials in a liberal democracy should
rely on nonreligious bases for judgment is one that finds fairly frequent expression and occasional systematic defense. In an admirable recent introduction to ethics and law, for example, David Lyons suggested that political morality should be governed by
principles and arguments "accessible to all persons." He stated
that to reject the idea of "a naturalistic and public conception of
political morality . . . is to deny the essential spirit of democracy."1 Under this view, officials act improperly if they ground
their decisions on religious bases, and citizens violate the spirit of
democracy if they make arguments or press political objectives on
religious grounds. The logic of Lyons' position also precludes citizens from making up their own minds about public issues on religious grounds.
Two decades earlier, in a well known article concerning obscenity as a sin, Louis Henkin wrote: "The domain of government, it is
suggested, is that in which social problems are resolved by rational
social processes, in which men can reason together, can examine
problems and propose solutions capable of objective proof or persuasion, subject to objective scrutiny by courts and electors."2 In a
book defending reliance on religious convictions, Basil Mitchell
grouped Henkin with other thinkers as representing a new liberalism that presumes that religion, is a private matter that "belongs
1. D. LYoNs, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 191 (1984).
2. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 393,
411 (1963).
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to the realm of ideals, not to that of interests. It follows that religious considerations, as they affect morality, should have no place
in law making." 3 Mitchell also quoted Glanville Williams, who
said: "'For the legislator, it seems sufficient to say that theological
speculations and controversies should have no place in the formation of rules of law, least of all rules of the criminal law which are
imposed upon believers and non-believers alike.'-4
This sort of liberal view has received systematic explication and
defense, if perhaps only incomplete application, from John Rawls.'
Rawls' theory is noted both for its "original position" approach to
developing principles of justice 6 and for the substantive principles
7
of justice he endorses, including the "difference principle." Although the particularly critical portion of Rawls' theory for the
purposes of this Article is the manner in which he believes that
real people should resolve debated political issues in a society,
Rawls' views concerning that issue briefly need to be put in the
context of the rest of his theory.
Rawls imagines people in an original position, in which they
have general knowledge but do not know their own personal characteristics, social position, or particular conceptions of "good." Behind this "veil of ignorance," they choose principles of justice that
will best serve their own interests. This model is designed to produce principles that are fair, because every person in these circumstances would choose principles without knowing which principles
would favor him in his actual place in society. The principles chosen under this model, according to Rawls, would be a combination
of equal liberty, fair equality of opportunity, and a "difference
principle" that permits inequalities of income and wealth only insofar as the improvements for members of higher classes work to
the benefit of representative persons in the lowest class.
At first glance, Rawls' original position approach may appear to
exclude all reference to religion in establishing principles of justice,
and to do so by fiat. The resulting theory of justice could hardly be

3. B. MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY AND RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY 100 (1967).
4. G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1958), quoted in B.
MITCHELL, supra note 3, at 127.
5. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
6. See id. at 17-22.
7. See id. at 75-80.
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expected to persuade those who think that revealed truth demands
some very different approach to social justice. For example, suppose that all the members of a society actually were committed to
a singular religious vision, such as Islamic fundamentalism, that
assigned roles and opportunities on a basis that varied from the
equality of opportunity that would be chosen under Rawls' original
position. In such a society, individuals would be guided by their
revealed understanding of right social ordering, rather than by
principles that would have been chosen in an original position
under conditions of ignorance about "ultimate truth." If Moslem
women, as well as Moslem men, freely choose the roles assigned to
them by Islamic fundamentalism, even an outsider would have to
concede that this society would not be "unfair" in failing to afford
women every opportunity available to men. What otherwise might
be unfair would be rendered fair by the free choice of the "disadvantaged" to remain in their positions.'
As Robert Wolff has said, "[It is] obvious that the parties in the
original position are rational, secular, scientific men and women."'
Many readers of A Theory of Justice believed that Rawls effectively was stipulating that his principles of justice are the only
principles that could result from rational self-interested choice
under conditions of ignorance. 10 In subsequent writings, Rawls has
disclaimed any ambition to establish a single, rationally best set of

8. The conclusion suggested here raises some tricky issues. A Rawlsian might say that a
failure to afford equal liberty and opportunity to all women would be unfair, even if every
woman, or the vast majority of women, choose to restrict themselves. I assume that if all
women of one generation and their growing daughters freely chose not to have certain opportunities, educating women in a way that would impair their access to those opportunities
would not be unjust, even if the daughters had not yet reached a fully mature judgment
about the opportunities. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (children's interests
and parents' interests assumed to coincide). That assumption is debatable, as is, of course,
the notion that any group ever could freely choose to be as subservient as Moslem women,
in the fundamentalist vision, are supposed to be. Perhaps a clearer example of a practice not
being unjust that would be barred by the original position analysis would be society's keeping the least advantaged group at a very low level of income and wealth, when all members
of that group freely believed that their religious salvation depended upon having only a
subsistence income.
9. R. WOLFF,UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 127 (1977).
10. Some readers doubted that any single set of principles could be so derived, worrying
that the conditions of the original position posited by Rawls were not specific enough to
yield one set of principles, that they were manipulated to reach the results Rawls happened
to favor, or that both problems were present in various aspects of the conditions.
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principles of justice. Instead, he has stated that his goal has been
to develop the principles that best elaborate the "basic intuitive
ideas that are embedded in the political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions of their interpretation,"1 1 most importantly the idea of "fair social cooperation
between free and equal persons."1 2 These basic intuitive ideas have
been accepted by an "overlapping consensus" that includes the opposing philosophical and religious doctrines likely to persist in a
more or less just democratic society. 3 Thus, Rawls implicitly says
that a strict Islamic republic is unjust by liberal conceptions, not
that it is absolutely unjust.
Because Rawls asserts that his theory is based on shared ideas of
liberal democracy, he is not directly concerned with what might
lead an individual to accept these ideas. Some people, for example,
might accept the substance of Rawls' theory because they believe
that God created human beings to exercise their moral autonomy
and a Rawlsian society would best promote that exercise. Rawls'
theory, devoted to developing the implication of basic premises,
does not suggest that religious grounds for accepting those premises are inappropriate.
What is inappropriate under Rawls' theory, however, is reliance
on religious grounds to decide political issues in a society that accepts his conception of justice. 14 Rawls makes clear that citizens
should be guided by this conception in their political decisions. Because this conception of justice does not rely on a particular religious perspective or standard of good, citizens deciding what is just
would not rely on particular religious perspectives or standards of
good.

11. Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Politicalnot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 223, 225
(1985). For a sympathetic explanation and defense of Rawls' position, see Rorty, The Priority of Democracy over Philosophy (forthcoming).
12. Rawls, supra note 11, at 229; see Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77
J. PHIL. 515, 516-22 (1980) (indicating that aspects of his theory of justice may depend on a
particular "conception of the person" in the original position).
13. Rawls, supra note 11, at 225-26.
14. As one commentator has noted, the reasons for adopting a theory of justice might
differ from the reasons permitted to actors making practical choices in a society in which
the principles of the theory were accepted. Ackerman, What Is Neutral About Neutrality?,

93

ETHICS

372, 387 (1983).
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Discussing restrictions on exercises of religious conscience, Rawls
has stated explicitly that the state "does not concern itself with
philosophical and religious doctrine but regulates individuals' pursuit of their moral and spiritual interests in accordance with principles to which they themselves would agree in an initial situation
of equality." 15 Any reasonable expectation of damage to the public
order that is relevant to political decisions must "be based on evidence and ways of reasoning acceptable to all. . . . [A] departure
from generally recognized ways of reasoning would involve a privileged place for the views of some over others, and a principle which
permitted this could not be agreed to in the original position.""
Rawls also has observed, more recently: "In public questions, ways
of reasoning and rules of evidence for reaching true general beliefs
that help settle whether institutions are just should be of a kind
everyone can recognize. ' 17 The relevant standards for political decision, according to Rawls, are the shared principles of justice "and
' Rawls thus
practices of common sense and science."18
supposes
that citizens in a liberal democracy should resolve the questions of
value and fact that are relevant to justice without relying on particular religious convictions.
One possible qualification to Rawls' conclusion concerns subjects
that are outside the reach of his theory of justice. By discussing
only relations between human beings within an existing political
community, Rawls has failed to address the relations of human beings to animals or the relations of one human society to another,
although he has recognized that important political choices include
these matters. 9 Rawls may suppose that reciprocal relations
among members of different societies could be addressed by extending the original position somehow, 20 but because reciprocity
does not govern relations between human beings and other animals, Rawls' position gives no clear indication how sound principles to govern these interactions might be derived. Rawls gives no

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 212.
Id. at 213.
Rawls, supra note 12, at 539.
Id.
J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 17, 504, 512.
20. See generally C. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 126-83
(1979) (discussing justice between nations).
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hint that a shift to a transcendental perspective might be appropriate in considering these relationships; because political choices
about the treatment of animals affect other human beings and because Rawls does not qualify his later statements about reliance on
shared standards and methods for ascertaining truth, one may suppose that he thinks that fairness to other individuals involved requires that political choices about animals be made on rational,
secular grounds.
The inappropriateness of reliance on religious conviction in
politics has been stated more clearly and absolutely by Bruce Ackerman in Social Justice in the Liberal State.21 Regarding constrained dialogue about power as the centerpiece of liberal political
theory, Ackerman has said:
[N]obody has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied
[to] the rest of us. A power structure is illegitimate if it can be
justified only through a conversation in which some person (or
group) must assert that he is (or they are) the privileged moral
authority:
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power
holder to assert:
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted
by any of his fellow citizens, or
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens."
Perhaps not every political reliance on religious conviction would
amount to an assertion of one's own "conception of the good,"
though Ackerman's notion of what that conception covers is very
broad. Ackerman, however, has made plain that the grounds for
liberal political decisions should be secular and rational. He talks
for example about the liberal state being "deprived of divine revelation" in developing a policy toward nature23 and, in language
that reflects less than enthusiastic sympathy with religious
21. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
22. Id. at 10-11; see also A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 112 (1981) (summarizing Ronald
Dworkin's position as being "that the central doctrine of modern liberalism is the thesis that
questions about the good life for man or the ends of human life are to be regarded from the
public standpoint as systematically unsettlable" (emphasis in original)).
23. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 103.
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perspectives, he precludes restricting abortions "on the basis of
24
some conversation with the spirit world.
Richard Flathman has spoken of Ackerman's notion of "neutral
dialogue" as tolerably familiar as an aspect of liberal theory, one
designed to avoid destructive conflict.2 5 According to Flathman,
the idea that "in politics each of us must cease to claim the superiority of our conception of good and order our interactions by principles neutral among such conceptions" is a "self-denying ordinance" that was "historically first or at least most emphatically
'26
adopted in respect to religious beliefs.
The thesis that political decisions should be made on secular rational grounds is a claim about the ethical import of liberal democracy, about what "good citizenship" in that polity entails. One who
accepts this thesis is not committed to saying that people in existing liberal democracies actually do disregard religious convictions in making political decisions, or even that religious individuals are fully capable of doing so. The thesis also does not concern
the minimal conditions in which liberal democracy can operate
with reasonable effectiveness; 2 nor does it fundamentally concern
legal constraints. Indeed, one aspect of religious and political liberty is that people are legally free to talk about and be influenced
by the political implications of their religious views.
Indeed, short of arguments, or at least assumptions, that directly
challenge religious premises themselves, the thesis does not even
concern what a person who is a citizen in a liberal democracy
should, overall, do. An example illustrates this point. Suppose that
Jody believes that God considers the drinking of alcohol to be sinful, that God wishes humans to refrain from drinking alcohol, that
God wishes organized societies to stamp out this practice, that individuals who drink alcohol will be visited with heavy penalties after death, and that individuals within societies that permit the
drinking of alcohol will be visited with similar penalties. Jody understandably would seek to have her society enact laws against the
drinking of alcohol, despite her recognition that many people in
24. Id. at 127.
25. Flathman, EgalitarianBlood and Skeptical Turnips, 93 ETHIcs 357 (1983).
26. Id.
27. As Ackerman said, "[N]o liberal government can expect all its citizens to behave like
liberal statesmen all of the time." B. AcKERMAN, supra note 21, at 302.
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society do not share her religious convictions and believe that they
have a moral right to use alcohol. Persuading her that neutral dialogue or a decision under the hypothetical conditions of an original
position would lead to allowing adults freedom to choose whether
or not to drink alcohol hardly would change her mind, given her
present insight into transcendent truth. What Jody wants to accomplish makes perfect sense if she has conceived religious truth
correctly. Her opponents would be silly, therefore, to tell Jody that
she should not impose her religious views on others, as if some
common basis of rational understanding would allow Jody to acknowledge the correctness of that claim without abandoning an aspect of her religious faith.
What a sensitive understanding of Jody's position does not require is that others acknowledge that her aims are consonant with
the premises of liberal democracy. A liberal democracy tolerates
people like Jody, just as it tolerates people who wish to establish a
dictatorship of the proletariat, but Jody's political program definitely is not a liberal democratic program. History and the world
around us afford ample demonstrations of religious views that are
not consonant with the principles of liberal democracy, though
people with such views may comfortably coexist for long periods of
time within democratic states. Jody's opponents can say to her:
"We understand why you are doing what you are doing, but we
want to make clear that your aims fall outside the boundaries of
our traditions and that, if similar aims were shared by many
others, maintaining an open, pluralist society would be extremely
difficult. In that important sense, you are not acting like a good
citizen of a liberal democracy."
The claimed exclusion of religious grounds of decision is based in
part on the notion that a liberal government knows no religious
truth. The concession that religious truth is not the government's
business is one that many Americans are not presently willing to
make, but that assumption underlies a good bit of the American
constitutional law of church and state, and it is a starting point for
those who urge that citizens and legislators should not rely on religious convictions. The idea that the government knows no religious
truth is logically distinguishable from the idea that rational public
grounds cannot be used to settle disputes about religious truth, but
the two ideas are closely related. If one starts with a supposition
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that political dialogue and grounds of decisions should be cast in
terms that are accessible to all, specialized religious convictions, in
a liberal society, plainly would fall outside such terms, and therefore would have to be excluded. Although historical fears about religious divisiveness might help to generate belief that religious bases warrant exclusion, that exclusion could be best understood as
one aspect of a positive program to develop shared bases of decision. Should such bases exist, those who defend political decisions
could claim that the decisions are defensible for reasons that have
intersubjective validity for all members of society. The law and its
restrictions on liberty then could be seen as based on a shared understanding of reason, not on the whim of those who happen to be
more numerous and powerful. This aspiration is appealing.
Whether it is realistic is a major subject of this Article.28
III. ANIMAL

RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The areas that I use in this Article to test the soundness of the
exclusion of religious bases of decision are animal rights and environmental policy. The critical inquiry concerns the capacity of rational secular grounds to resolve the critical questions that bear on
desirable legal policy. I am highly skeptical about that capacity,
and my conclusions about reliance on religious convictions are
closely related to that skepticism.
A. Human Morality and Moral Consideration for Nonhuman
Entities
What do human beings owe to other animals and to the rest of
the natural environment? This broad question can be subdivided
28. Even if the claim that religious bases of decision are inappropriate in a liberal democracy is accepted, religious perspectives are not rendered wholly irrelevant to proper political
decisions. Religious perspectives still may figure indirectly. For example, if a legislature
must decide which day of the week to declare a day off and the majority of the population
wishes strongly, for religious reasons, not to work on Sunday, satisfaction of that general
desire would be a rational secular ground for choosing Sunday. Similarly, if polygamy was
harmful for good secular reasons in a country in which the vast majority of the population
was committed to monogamy, a generally held religious belief that God calls for monogamy
might lead indirectly to a decision not to authorize polygamy. Rational secular bases of
decision would not have to disregard the effect of practices that are embedded in the culture
because of religious beliefs. What would be barred would be direct reliance on religious convictions in determining what the law should be.
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into what humans owe to other individual entities in their individual capacities and what they should do about preserving nature in
a more general sense. The drowning of cats terminates the lives of
particular sentient creatures, but does not threaten the environment; constructing a ski resort above the timberline alters a natural setting, but may affect nonhuman creatures only incidentally.
Someone who is concerned about the interests of individual animals may be relatively indifferent to whether particular species or
features of the physical world can survive over time, and someone
who cares deeply about preservation of species and natural settings
may be indifferent to the survival of individual members of plentiful species. Indeed, for some ethical choices, such as the propriety
of sport hunting,29 an environmental ethic may point in an entirely
different direction from an animal rights ethic. Nonetheless, both
ethics, and the subjects they address, go beyond a morality that
concentrates exclusively on relations among human beings. In doing so, the two ethics share common themes and raise common
questions.
An ethic that claims a morally protected status for nonhuman
entities must face a possible threshold difficulty-one that is immediately terminological but that has underlying substantive implications. Morality often is viewed as a means by which human
beings achieve a tolerable social existence together. The subjects of
moral duties undoubtedly must have moral capabilities, and
among creatures on this earth, those capabilities may exclude all
but humans.30 If rights and justice are understood as involving reciprocal moral relations among members of the same social community, then, barring the possibility of sufficiently significant interaction between animals with moral capacity and humans, only
human beings, and perhaps only human beings with a minimal
level of moral capacity, may qualify as bearers of rights who are
29. See, e.g., Loftin, The Morality of Hunting, 6 ENvTL. ETHICS 241 (1984).
30. For the position that some animals ought to be viewed as moral agents, see Miller, Do
Animals Have Interests Worthy of Our Moral Interests?, 5 ENVTL. ETHICS, 319, 331-32

(1983); Rachels, Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty?, in ANIMAL

RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLI-

205, 214-19 (1976); Watson, Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature, 1 ENVTL. ETHICS 99, 128 (1979). The minimum conditions of being a moral
agent is a complex question that this Article does not pursue.
GATIONS
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owed justice. Both Rawls and Ackerman, for example, assume that
3
justice concerns relations among people. 1
That a system of morality may include duties owed to creatures
without moral capacity is perfectly clear.3 2 Most people think they
have moral duties toward members of the human species who lack
moral capacity, and also think they have duties toward higher animals that obligate them at least not to subject these animals to
gratuitous cruelty. Among systematic moral views, utilitarianism
traditionally has counted the pains and pleasures of all sentient
creatures. Rawls explicitly has recognized that "how we are to conduct ourselves toward animals and the rest of nature" is a moral
question "of the first importance," which his contract theory does
not cover.33 Ackerman has gone beyond Rawls in examining how
these problems might be resolved, but what he has said is notably
inconclusive. According to Ackerman, people may disagree concerning whether animals and the rest of nature are simply to be
regarded as means to human ends or whether they should be preserved, and the liberal state must recognize the tentativeness of
34
any policy established toward nature.
If moral duties can be owed to nonhuman creatures, as they undoubtedly can, the purely terminological question whether such
creatures are potential subjects of rights or justice is not particularly important. What is important is whether duties of the type
and stringency associated with rights and justice are owed to
nonhumans. If a moral bar existed against killing innocent animals
that was as absolute as the bar against killing innocent human beings, the duty to protect animals would have the same stringency

31. See J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 17, 504, 512; see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at
69-103 (asserting that citizenship in the liberal state requires an ability to speak the language and participate in the dialogue of the state). But cf. id. at 74, 80 (asserting that an
animal such as an ape someday may pass the test for citizenship in the liberal state).
32. See, e.g., G. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORAL'ITY 151 (1971).
33. J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 17; see id. at 504, 512. Tom Regan has interpreted the
cryptic passages in Rawls' book somewhat differently, seeking to provide a coherent account
of how Rawls' view about duties to nonhuman entities can be fitted within his contract
theory. T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 163-74 (1983). Regan amply demonstrates
that Rawls' views about duties to nonhumans cannot be accommodated comfortably within
his contractarian approach. The impossibility of this accommodation supports my reading
that Rawls did not intend such a fit.
34. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 102-03.
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as the duty associated with the right to life. No doubt some kinds
of duties, such as truth telling, do not apply to relations with nonhuman animals, and other kinds of duties, such as the duty of fair
play, may depend on reciprocal interactions.3 5 Duties not to cause
harm and duties of benevolence, however, are potentially applicable to animals, and their possible application cannot be foreclosed
by some conceptual bar. For this reason, I shall not attempt to
restrict the terms "rights" and "justice" to relations among creatures with moral capacity, assuming instead that moral "patients"
may have rights and claims of justice, even though others must
make the claims on their behalf.3 6
The second common subject of animal rights and environmental
protection concerns the place of human beings in the world. The
relative predominance of human beings is critical in determining
what they owe to nonhumans. At one extreme is the view that nature, including animals, is for human dominion. At the other extreme is the idea that nature is sacred, an aspect of God or gods.
An intermediate conception is one of stewardship: that human beings have a responsibility for preserving the welfare and integrity
of the natural world.
A third common problem concerns the standard for judging a
proper moral conception. Should an individual considering
whether a duty is owed to nonhuman entities view the question in
terms of the intrinsic worth of those entities or in terms of the
manner of thinking that would be best for human beings in the
long run? If the proper moral standard for protecting animals and
natural objects were explicitly the welfare of present and future
human generations, then the standard still would concern morality
among human beings, including intergenerational duties. Duties to
other human beings might include not harming some animals, just
as these duties might include not harming some automobiles, but
no duties would be owed directly to the animals. If duties were
35. See T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 168 (analyzing the view that humans do not owe a
duty of justice to animals because animals cannot owe a duty of justice to humans). Morality is not solely a matter of reciprocal interaction, however, as the existence of duties owed
to future generations of humans demonstrates. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 111-13. I

assume, though I do not try to demonstrate, that such duties exist.
36. Readers who think this terminology is inapt can translate passages that use them into
a terminology that refers to stringent human duties.
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owed to animals and other natural objects because of their inherent worth, on the other hand, then a proper moral conception
would transcend the interests of humans, even broadly conceived.
An intermediate possibility, which was suggested by Immanuel
Kant, 37 also exists. This view is that it is critically important for
humans to respect animals and nature. The idea is that if humans
become insensitive and cruel to animals, they will become hardened in their relations to other humans, and humans that do not
respect nature will squander the earth in a way that will deprive
future human beings whose interests they are not competent to assess. A respectful attitude toward nature, proponents of this view
contend, teaches people to accept the severe restrictions on human
endeavors and helps lower their level of frustration. Moreover, an
attitude that animals and nature are not to be dominated contributes to less domineering and aggressive attitudes among people
and thus enhances human social existence. Although this attitude
is one in which ordinary people would attach intrinsic value to animals and nature, the ultimate philosophical justification for the attitude is that it will be good for people.3 8 A.supporter of a practical
ethic favoring protection of animals or nature, of course, might
claim both that the ethic is required by the inherent worth of nonhuman entities and that it is best for humans in the long run.
The crucial questions for the purposes of this Article are
whether entities other than human beings intrinsically deserve
protection and, if so, how much. Given the fundamental uncertainty about the impact that attitudes toward animals and toward
nature have on the behavior of human beings toward each other,
the critical questions also would arise if they were reformulated in
terms of the attitudes that ultimately are best for humans. Because
37. See I. KANT, Duties to Animals and Spirits, in LECTURES ON ETHICS (L. Infield trans.
1963), reprintedin ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS 122-23 (1976).
38. See, e.g., M. Fox, RETURNING TO EDEN: ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
157-58 (1980); C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAvE STANDING? 42-54 (1974); see also Norton, Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism, 6 ENvTL. ETHICS 131, 136 (1984) (asserting that Hindus and Jains proscribe the killing of insects out of concern for their own spiritual development rather than for the lives of the insects). This relation between ultimate
justification and actual attitude is closely similar to the relation posited by the claim that
nonconsequential attitudes toward morals will produce the best consequences over the long

run.
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the underlying issues remain the same, I do not pursue this extra
step of complexity at each stage.
Once the major alternative views of the place of humanity in the
universe have been identified, the alternatives that have relevance
to animal rights and environmental protection are immediately evident, and the potential relevance of religious convictions is also
apparent. A major theme of religions is interpreting the place of
human beings in nature. Indeed, in some attacks on present environmental attitudes, the Judeo-Christian view that nature was created for man's domination has been portrayed as the major villain." In response, some have argued that the major strands of
Judaism and Christianity place stewardship responsibilities upon
human beings, and that a modern secular notion of progress, and
not religion, is the main threat to protection of nature.40 One author has suggested that the break between humans and nature is
much stronger in Judaism than in Christianity, with its doctrine of
the Incarnation.4 1 Without question, some eastern religions accord
greater respect to nature and animals, and perceive a much lesser
break between human beings and the rest of nature than do major
western religions.
The central question for my analysis is whether citizens should
eschew religious perspectives in resolving the degree of protection
to accord animals and nature. The plausibility of the position that
citizens in a liberal democracy should disregard religious perspectives depends on the promise of secular rational grounds to resolve
such matters.
B. Animal Rights
I first discuss what moral consideration is owed to individual entities as such, what may loosely be termed "animal rights." The
label is loose because, as I have noted previously, 42 use of the term
"rights" in this context is disputable, no matter how stringent the
duties of human beings. The label also is loose in including a

39. See, e.g., White, The HistoricalRoots of our Ecological Crisis, in THE ENVIRONMEN3 (J. Barr ed. 1971).
40. See R. ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 20-87 (1983).
41. Schwarzchild, The UnnaturalJew, 6 ENVTL. ETHICS 347, 349-50 (1984).
42. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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position that animals are owed significant moral consideration,
even if the manner in which humans should take their interests
into account is by some sort of utilitarian calculus rather than
stringent duties. Furthermore, the category of entities warranting
protection might be narrower, or perhaps broader, than all
animals.
What I mean by consideration owed to "individual entities as
such" is that the consideration does not depend either on the interest of some other kinds of entities, such as human beings, or on
the number of similar entities in existence. Protection is not owed,
for example, because the entity is one of the last remaining members of a species or other set of natural objects.
The three major questions for public policy are: (1) which entities are owed moral consideration in their own right; (2) how does
that consideration relate to the consideration owed to human beings; and (3) to what extent should judgments of this sort be embodied in law and other government decisions? The idea that some
moral consideration is owed to certain entities would not necessarily dictate that legal protection is appropriate; one simply might
leave choices to the private sector. The existence in many countries
of laws forbidding cruelty to animals, however, shows that, at least
at the edges, legal protection often is regarded as warranted. Under
many views of the moral consideration owed animals, therefore,
some protection by law is appropriate.
An individual holding an extreme version of the human dominion view would assert that other entities exist solely for the benefit
of human beings. That basic view could be given a nonreligious
cast in two ways. First, one could argue that the critical capacities
of ordinary human beings 43 are so far superior to other existing
creatures that any action that contributes to human welfare or satisfaction is warranted, no matter how little the contribution and no
matter how great the impairment to other creatures. A traditional
version of this position is the notion, found in the writings of Aris-

43. I refer to "ordinary human beings." Related to the issue of animal rights is the issue
of how much consideration to give members of the human species who are incapable of
development to even the level of the higher animals. Proponents of animal rights often have
criticized "specism," and have claimed that severely retarded and handicapped human beings are owed no more consideration than animals of equivalent capacity. See T. REGAN,
supra note 33, at 232-65.
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totle and Kant, that the ability to reason abstractly is the basis for
moral respect and that only humans have that capacity. 44 Under
this view, human beings need not accord any inherent value to
other animals.45 This view claims to be objective, in the sense that
it presents reasons that would be persuasive to hypothetical intelligent creatures from other planets and would lead them to accord
moral consideration to human beings and to deny it to other
animals.
Second, one could advance a kind of "law of the jungle" approach. Proponents of this view would assert that the interests of
human beings and other animals come into conflict and, because
human actions are incapable of eliciting moral restraint from other
animals, 46 humans have nothing to gain by extending moral consideration to them. Therefore, in human morality, which is designed
to make social life tolerable for human beings, no consideration
need be given to other animals. This perspective is the substantive
analogue of the terminological claim that animals cannot be subjects of rights and justice because they are not participants in
moral practices. The force of this perspective is limited to the domain of human morality; it does not provide any reason, as the
first view does, why creatures from another planet should similarly
accord preference to human beings unless these creatures are capable of moral interactions with human beings and not animals.
Neither defense of the absolute dominion view is compelling.
The uniqueness of some human capacities and the superiority of
others hardly seems adequate to justify according no moral significance to the interests of other animals. The "law of the jungle"
view either is circular, because it restates an undefended assumption that morality must be entirely reciprocal, or is confused. The
propositions that many moral norms embody notions of reciprocity
and that enrichment of human social life is a crucial aspect of mo-

44. See Miller, supra note 30, at 321.
45. One might say that human beings at least should weigh the interests of other animals
when a matter is indifferent to humans but, because even having to think in these terms is
something of an inconvenience, a total disregard of animal interests might be warranted
under this extreme view by the human interest in avoiding that inconvenience.
46. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. The assumption is that, if other animals are capable of exercising moral restraint at all, human actions are incapable of generating that restraint in favor of human interests.
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rality do not entail the conclusion that the proper boundaries of
morality are so rigidly set.47 Perhaps human beings should consider
the welfare of other beings who they can injure or benefit, though
their own lives will not be enriched by doing so. For example,
humans commonly assume that they owe something to distant generations who cannot enrich the social life of present generations. If
the propriety of this duty is acknowledged, no reason appears for
limiting it to present and future human beings to the exclusion of
other occupants of the planet. Most people's strong intuition is
that humans do owe something to at least some other animals.
If consideration is owed to some animals, what is the outer limit
of this duty? Human beings seem confident that they do not owe
anything to a stone or a dead twig. Individuals with a fancy to
crush a small stone or to break a twig commit no moral wrong in
doing so, at least so far as the stone or twig is concerned. 4 To
deserve moral consideration, an entity must have at least one capacity or characteristic that stones and dead twigs do not have.
Among the possibilities are moral capacity, capacity for language,
self-consciousness-that is, conception of oneself as a distinct being-fear of death, fear of other consequences and anxiety, consciousness, ability to experience pleasure and pain, having a good
of their own, and being alive.49
The decision as to which animals deserve protection, of course, is
complicated by the difficulty that humans have in understanding
what animals' experiences are like. But humans can be virtually certain that many animals are conscious and do experience

47. A similar question is whether individuals should violate moral norms if they can do so
with impunity. Of course, the simple answer to this question is that the violation is morally
wrong. If the true basis of morality is reciprocal advantage, however, why should individuals
not do what is morally wrong if they are confident it will be to their advantage? Moral
norms themselves cannot provide an answer to this deeper question of what individuals
"should" do.
48. One might think that any manifestation of anger is wrong, and that breaking a twig in
anger thus might be wrong. This wrong, however, would not arise because of the interests of
the twig. Whether it would be a "moral" wrong is a further question that is beyond the
scope of this Article.
49. This list of possibilities is not exhaustive; nor are these possibilities necessarily distinctive. R.G. Frey, for example, has suggested that language is necessary to have selfconsciousness and to have interests. R. FREY, INTERESTS AND RIGHTS: THE CASE AGAINST ANIMALS (1980). This view is criticized effectively in T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 38-49, and in
Miller, supra note 30, at 322-29.
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pleasure and pain,5 0 and they can be fairly confident that many
mammals also are self-conscious in some sense. Because avoidance
of pain is a dominant aspect of human morality, the idea that people should not cause unnecessary pain to animals is an appealing
starting point, which is reflected both in statutes forbidding cruelty to animals and in the traditional utilitarian view. As Jeremy
Bentham put it: "The question is not, Can they Reason? nor Can
'51
they talk? but, Can they suffer?
Whether painless death is a moral consequence for animals is
more complicated. If a healthy animal is killed and its death does
not cause pain to other animals, such as its offspring, its death still
cuts off the possibility of future pleasurable experiences. Viewed
by itself, death is a harm to the animal even if the animal has no
consciousness or fear of death.
A more troublesome question is whether that harm can be canceled effectively by the life of another similar animal.52 Often the
infliction of death on one animal is part of a practice that permits
life for a larger number of animals than would otherwise exist.
This question is critical, for example, when animals are killed to
provide meat. If every human being were a vegetarian, much
smaller numbers of animals of some species, including cattle,
would be alive. In one respect, therefore, meat-eating practices
could be viewed as good for these species, and the painless death of
some members of the species could be viewed as fully justified by
the prospects of life for other members. Humans in effect would

50. Of course, human beings cannot be certain, for example, that when an animal reacts
to a burn with physical manifestations that resemble human reactions, the animal is experiencing pain in the way that humans do. The conclusion that the animal does feel something
similar, however, is not much less secure than a similar conclusion drawn about what other
human beings feel. For a careful and persuasive discussion of animal awareness, see T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 1-81.
51. J. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 27, § 1
(London 1789), quoted in T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 95, and in P. SINGER, PRACTICAL
ETHICS 50 (1979). Regan has made the interesting point that not all pain involves suffering,
and he considers Bentham astute for making his claim in terms of suffering. T. REGAN,
supra note 33, at 95. For a defense of sentience as the critical standard for moral consideration, see L. SUMMER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 124-60 (1981).
52. This question could be categorized as an aspect of the balancing of interests rather
than as an aspect of the limits of moral consideration. It is discussed in this section, however, because the balancing of interests examined in this Article is between human interests
and animal interests, and this inquiry involves a comparison of interests of similar animals.
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owe no moral duty to preserve the life of an animal when its death
is part of practice in which another similar life will be substituted.
In that event, slaughter for food would be acceptable, quite independently of any human interests served by the practice.
The problem of "replaceability" exposes a critical distinction between a consequence-oriented approach to the treatment of animals and a genuine rights approach. If good treatment is based on
utilitarian grounds, then killing that is painless, and that does not
produce fear and anxiety in other animals, is canceled morally by
substitution. If an individual animal has a right not to be killed, on
the other hand, then its death is a moral wrong even if the result of
sparing such animals is a marked decrease in the population of
that part of the animal kingdom. Of course, the replaceability argument need not be adopted in its entirety. Peter Singer has suggested that the replaceability theory can justify the killing of animals who are not self-conscious, but not those who are selfconscious, a category in which Singer includes apes, whales, and
dolphins, and perhaps monkeys, dogs, cats, pigs, and bears.5 3 As
Tom Regan has suggested, the utilitarian premises that Singer embraces are not conducive to this sharp distinction."' Under another
approach to basic moral questions, however, self-consciousness
more plausibly might be thought to form an appropriate dividing
line between animals that should be recognized as having rights
and animals that should not.
If the ability to experience pleasure and pain creates a basis for
minimal moral concern, not all animals qualify on that ground.
Some apparently do not have such experiences. Many people have
no moral compunction about how they treat animals such as insects and worms, believing that these animals suffer little, if at all.
The basic standard of moral consideration could be broadened in
various ways. If it were broadened to reach all living entities or all
entities capable of having "a good of their own," it might reach all
animals, and plants as well. 5 Although a defender of this position
has acknowledged that the moral significance of plants can be

53. P. SINGER, supra note 51, at 93-105.
54. T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 206-11.
55. See R. ATTFIELD, supra note 40, at 154, 156-57.
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"almost infinitesimal," 56 this view would acknowledge that a tree's
good can be frustrated, and that not only chopping the tree down
but also tearing a leaf off the tree involves some moral harm.
Because my analysis is limited to examining the interests of entities insofar as they might bear on public policy and legal protection, plants and lower forms of animals perhaps can be disregarded. Even if individual flies and oak trees are entitled to some
moral consideration, they are not on that basis likely candidates
for protection by law. 7 No doubt the threshold of moral consideration necessary to affect what the government itself should do may
be lower than the threshold necessary to justify government restrictions of private choice. If individual trees warrant moral consideration, that consideration might affect what the government
should do in national forests even if it does not affect what the
government demands of private owners of forests.
More important than this subtlety, however, are the hard questions about legal protection. These questions concern, most significantly, which animals warrant enough moral consideration to make
them fit subjects for legal protection, and which of these animals'
interests qualify in this respect. For example, is painless killing a
harm against which legal protection is possibly appropriate? If so,
is it possibly appropriate even if the factual conditions for replacement are met?
A judgment about the appropriate use of the law also requires
some moral assessment of animal interests against human interests. At this level, the difficulties become even greater. The spectrum extends from equality, in some sense, to an extreme priority
for human interests. The latter position can be viewed as the import of present law. No protection based on the capacities and
characteristics of individual animals is given to animal life per se.
Wanton, unnecessary cruelty is forbidden. Rules regulating the use
of laboratory animals do provide safeguards regarding their care
and the conditions in which these animals are kept, and they also
constrain the infliction of pain in the absence of demonstrable
56. Id. at 154.
57. Of course, as valuable property, oak trees receive legal protection against damage
from nonowners, and one certainly can imagine legal restrictions barring owners from de-

stroying trees on aesthetic or broader environmental grounds. These reasons for legal protections, however, do not suppose that individual trees have inherent worth.
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research needs. Still, virtually any tenable human interest carries
the day, justifying severe imposition on the lives of animals. In
animal laboratories, for example, extensive loss of animal life is
permitted, even when the products being tested are considered
luxuries. 5 No rules exist against factory farming, which allows animals to grow in terribly confined conditions so that their development will be quicker and less expensive and their bodies will be
plumper than if they were permitted to roam free. The restrictions
on how owners can treat pets also are very limited.
Some individuals favoring animal rights argue for a move toward
a form of equality. The form of equality most favorable to the interests of animals would be one counting each animal life as heavily as each human life. Under this view, enhancing the life prospects of ten human beings would count no more than enhancing
the life prospects of ten chimpanzees. No investigation would be
made whether humans or chimpanzees have greater capacities for
fulfillment and happiness. Many people currently adopt a similar
standard for human beings, viewing each improvement of life prospects equally regardless of the particular individual's capacity for
realizing the goods of life,59 but few, if any, people would extend
this egalitarianism to animals.6 0
We can assume that the relevant principle of equality will
take different capacities into account. The simple pain of a cat
would count as much as the simple pain of a human being, but the

58. Indeed, a common test of toxicity is to see how intensive a dosage is needed to kill
half of the experimental animals. T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 370-71.
59. One way to defend this egalitarianism among human beings is to claim that most
humans have roughly equal capacities and that societies should not get into the business of
judging comparative capacities.
60. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that any animal that crossed the threshold of ability
to question allocations of power and wealth would qualify for equal consideration, including
equal goods and a right to a liberal education. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 80. This
result follows from the rule that citizens cannot make arguments that depend on their conception of the good or their intrinsic superiority. Suppose that most animals in a species
were capable of attaining the quality of life of a normal three-year-old human. According to
Ackerman, each ordinary member of this species would be entitled as a matter of justice to
roughly the same shares of goods as ordinary human beings. Many people, including myself,
would find this conclusion strongly counterintuitive-so much so that Ackerman's rigorous
notions of neutrality and constrained dialogue seem plausible only as rules for a community
of rough equals in which the superiority of persons and of notions of the good is highly

debatable.
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principle also would recognize that, for some beings, the interest in
avoiding pain "involves an interest in foregoing the fear and confusion which would accompany the pain; and for some humans it further involves an interest in being able to have unsullied memories
and to form and implement future plans with confidence, and in
being spared a sense of humiliation and rejection." 61 Because of all
these correlative elements, pain of the same amount would be
treated as worse under the equality principle if it occurred in a
human being.
Of course, any attempt to apply an egalitarian principle runs
into the problem of assessing the "pure" pain that an animal feels
in comparison with what a human being feels and then weighing
the significance of the correlative elements. Although these "factual '8 2 questions may seem insurmountable, the equality approach
at least provides an answer to the basic issue of valuation. When
the deaths of animals and human beings are compared under the
equality approach, one has to decide how much human death is
worse because of foresight, fear, and the sense of loss of those who
survive, and how much it is worse because greater potentialities are
foreclosed.
The extent to which these troublesome questions of comparability would compromise an attempt to apply an equality approach
may depend very much on the assumptions made about what
moral consideration entitles an individual to receive. The comparability questions are most acute if one accepts some sort of consequentialist balancing of harms and benefits. They are largely
avoided, on the other hand, if one adopts the view that animals
have rights in a fairly strong sense. Tom Regan has provided a lucid explication of the latter view. 3 Regan suggests that animals, as
innocent beings with a right to life, may not be used as means for
the greater good. Under this view, even if the death of 1000 animals in experimentation would save 1000 human lives that otherwise would be lost,64 the experiments would not be morally

61. R. ATTFIELD, supra note 40, at 169.
62. One might doubt whether physical pain can be weighed against the pain of sullied
memory in any coherent way.
63. T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 266-400.
64. Although Regan, like other animal rights advocates, strongly contests the factual
plausibility of such an assumption, the implications of his claim about moral rights remain.
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justified. On the other hand, when a direct choice must be made
between human and animal lives-for example, when humans or
animals must be thrown from a lifeboat-the human life should be
preferred because a human death is a worse harm than an animal's
death. 5 Indeed, according to Regan, saving one human life is preferable to saving any number of animal lives, when a direct choice
must be made. A lesser harm imposed on many creatures, Regan
reasons, is better than a greater harm imposed on only one, even
when the total of the lesser harms exceeds the greater harm."
Although Regan manages to sidestep many of the dilemmas of
comparability, he does so at the cost of resolutions that are
strongly counterintuitive. Regan recognizes this, but he claims that
only a genuine rights approach can avoid inconsistency or indefensible differentiation-the inconsistency of treating animals worse
than moral "patients" of the human species whose capacities are
no greater than those of the animals, or the indefensible differentiation of moral agents from moral patients in terms of moral
consideration.
Even Regan, however, does not press the consistency argument
to its full logic. Human beings lacking moral capacity not only are
protected from harm caused by other humans, but also are actively
nurtured and protected from outside dangers. If moral considerations required humans to take an equivalent attitude toward mammals, humans would have to protect weaker species from
predators. Such actions might upset the "natural balance," but,
under Regan's theory, that would not be a sufficient reason to refrain from protecting the rights of individual animals that humans
are capable of protecting. The idea that humans should undertake
to protect all mammals from predators and natural disasters is
close to absurd, but its rejection substantially undermines the consistency argument that moral consideration for animals must be
understood as conferring strong rights. 7 Between near absolute
human priority and some version of equality lies an intermediate
65. T. REGAN, supra note 33, at 285.
66. Id. at 324-26.
67. Regan might respond by saying that defective humans have no right to be protected
from natural hazards, or that in this particular respect membership in the human species
does make a difference. If membership in the human species matters for this sort of positive
right, however, the reasons why it would not also matter for negative rights against human
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view that the higher capacities of humans give their interests
greater weight per se. From this standpoint, the pain of a person is
worse than the pain of a cat just because the person has greater
capacities, quite apart from the ways in which these capacities actually enhance the pain and its effects.
I shall not develop the arguments for and against these various
positions in a systematic way. The issue is discussed in a growing
body of literature, but what I have said thus far is enough to suggest the tenor of the competing assertions. Without reviewing each
claim carefully, one cannot confidently reach a conclusion about
the limits of rationality to resolve the issues. My own sense, however, is that, while rational argument can answer some of these
questions, and can raise often disturbing, new avenues of inquiry
that challenge complacent assumptions, much is left unsettled by
the possibilities of rational argument.
Rational argument can establish, I believe, that conscious animals capable of experiencing pain and pleasure should receive
some moral consideration, and that the pain or death of any such
animal, viewed by itself, is a harm to be avoided. These premises
alone, however, do not go very far toward an understanding of the
proper bounds of legal protection. Among the critical remaining
questions are: (1) whether the replacement argument is sufficient
to justify painless killing as part of a practice in which more animals live than otherwise would do so; (2) whether, in the sense in
which equality is plausible, animal interests should be counted
equal to human interests and, if not, how much priority should be
given human interests; and (3) whether, in dealing with conflicts of
human and animal interests, some kind of consequentialist weighing or some notion of strong rights is appropriate for animal interests. For these questions, analogies drawn to future generations of
humans or to treatment of defective humans are so far afield, and
of such uncertain resolution in their own right, that they provide
no sure footing for resolution. In the final analysis, then, the place
of convincing interpersonal argument seems decidedly limited, and
on critical questions people must resort to their own personal sense
of life and to reflective views with which they are comfortable.

harm are not clear. For a defense of a kind of species principle, see P. DEVINE, THE ETHICS
OF HOMICIDE 51-57 (1978).
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Given the limits of rational analysis, therefore, people inevitably
must go beyond the boundaries of persuasive rational argument in
assessing the proper legal protections of animals. This does not
mean that rational argument has no place. Because most people in
this society unthinkingly relegate the interests of animals, except
for domestic pets, to a very low plane, largely disregarding their
consciousness and capacity to suffer pain or frustration, rational
argument, as well as emotional appeal, can shake people loose from
any complacent and unthinking acceptance of near absolute
human priority. Once people begin to think seriously about the
problem of animals, however, rational analysis alone is incapable of
resolving a number of the questions that are critical to appropriate
legal protection.
C. Environmental Ethics
Skepticism about rational resolution of animal rights is multiplied manyfold for environmental protection. Strictly speaking, environmental ethics may include the possibility of protection for individual plants and individual natural objects, such as stones, as
well as the possibility of protection for the environment in a more
general sense. This Article, however, distinguishes between protection for individual entities as such and safeguards for more inclusive categories of being such as species, the land, the natural setting, ecosystems, and the biosphere.6 8 For the purposes of this
Article, an environmental ethic concerns itself with protections,
over time, of one or more of these larger categories of beings. The
worry is not the death or pain of individual entities, but human
destruction of the environment or failure to preserve it. The fundamental ethical issue is whether humans owe any moral duty to
protect the environment that goes beyond what they owe to other
individual humans, including future members of the human race,
and beyond what they may owe to individual animals.
Although a judgment that humans do owe some such duty may
have implications for private individual action, the extensive

68. See Norton, supra note 38, at 132. Of course, what constitutes an individual entity
and what constitutes a more inclusive category of being is not a matter of sharp distinction.
In this Article, however, an assumption is made that a river or mountain is not an individual
entity.
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coordination needed to prevent despoilation or alteration of the
environment makes this a problem whose main importance concerns defining public policy and formulating legal rules.
Consider a proposal to build a dam that would generate substantial human benefits but would endanger an obscure species of
fish-a species that has made no apparent contribution to human
welfare in the past and that is highly unlikely to make such a contribution in the future. Should the dam be built? The answer may
depend on one's attitude toward the environment. Someone who
focuses exclusively on the welfare of humans would weigh the benefits of the dam against the scientific and aesthetic interests in preserving species and the remote chance that this fish would contribute to human life in some unforeseen way in the distant future. On
the other hand, someone who starts with a fundamental notion of
respect for the environment, believing that humans have a responsibility not to work an irremediable change in the nature of the
world they inhabit, might think that the dam should not be built
even if the weighing of human interests was favorable to the dam.
Getting a rational secular handle on this borderline question of
valuation is difficult, unless the focus is on identifying the attitudes that are psychologically healthy for human beings to have. If
crushing one stone raises no moral question, why does destroying
the Grand Canyon raise a question except in terms of aesthetic
and other losses to people 9 and to other creatures warranting
moral consideration? Why should the life of one nearly extinct
snail darter count for more than the life of one salmon, if the
salmon's capacities are at least as great? With the subject of
animal rights, the inquiry at least could proceed by asking which of
the capacities that are thought deserving of moral protection in
humans also exist in animals. With the subject of environmental
ethics, even this exercise in analogy to ordinary moral problems is
unavailable.
That socialized human life will alter the environment in some
ways is inevitable, because animals, including human beings, affect

69. For an analysis of this issue cast in terms of the long-term interests of human beings,
see id.
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the settings they inhabit20 Yet many people feel concern about the
extermination of other species. 71 Rawls, for example, mentions in
passing that he views "destruction of a whole species" as a great
evil. 2 Others who have devoted themselves more intensely to the
problem of environmental ethics have spoken of diversity as a good
in itself;7 3 of the moral significance of the wellbeing of species, wil-

dernesses, and ecosystems;74 and of the importance of
"preserv[ing] the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic
community.

7' 5

One argument in favor of this view is that humans should recognize themselves as members of a community with interdependent
parts. Such a recognition, of course, necessarily would affect
human actions toward the environment, but why should it preclude a human-oriented perspective-one that would allow manipulation of the environment so long as long-term human interests
are not undermined? The idea that humans are an insignificant
part of a vast chain of being is as consonant with a "law of the
jungle" view, holding that humans should get all they can for
themselves, as it is with the view that humans must respect the
other beings and the environment as a whole.
Stuart Hampshire has written with some eloquence that "nature
can sustain those emotions associated with the superhuman," and
that it "is principally for this reason that the careless destruction
of a species seems disgraceful," since such destruction "expresses
an ignorant attitude, and a false philosophy, of dominance, as if
men were situated in the world as in their own garden. 71 6 Granting

Hampshire's point that the world is not our garden, the question
remains why human beings should not take all they can out of it. If
the main point is that nature deserves respect because of the emotions that respect for it can sustain, then Hampshire's conclusion
70. See Watson, A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism, 5 ENVTL. ETHICS 245,
253 (1983).
71. See Gunn, Why Should We Care About Rare Species?, 2 ENVTL. ETHICS 17 (1980).
72. J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 512.
73. See R. ATTFIELD, supra note 40, at 149-50 (discussing A. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN
OF BEING (1936)).
74. Johnson, Humanity, Holism, and Environmental Ethics, 5 ENVTL. ETHICS 345 (1983).
75. R. ATTFIELD, supra note 40, at 158 (quoting A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC
224-25 (1969)).
76. S. HAMPSHIRE, Two THEORIES OF MORALITY 91 (1977).

1986]

LIMITS OF RATIONALITY

1039

requires reversion either to a complex plea about psychological
health or to some nonrational judgment that this attitude is one
humans should have.
Unless one puts the justification in terms of psychological health
or in terms of a needed corrective to present human ignorance of
future possibilities, the claim that people should respect nature in
its own right and should try to preserve species is not one that can
be grounded successfully in rational argument. People have radically different reactions to what humans owe to nature in a larger
sense, and neither analogies to ordinary moral constraints nor
other forms of rational analysis provide much assistance in settling
the issue. Chief Seattle spoke of the rivers as "our brothers" to
whom people owe "kindness. ' 77 This manner of looking at the natural world is so contrary to most modern views that it seems odd,
but, unless it is based on some plain mistake about the location of
spirits, it is not irrational. Views that attach value to the preservation of species, and even to maintenance of the physical environment, are not contrary to reason, but they do require some nonrational commitment or judgment of value.

IV.

RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, NONRATIONAL JUDGMENTS, AND
POLITICAL PREMISES

The discussion thus far suggests a serious vulnerability in the
position that citizens and legislators should rely exclusively on
publicly accessible reasons in reaching political decisions. If rational premises and arguments are radically inconclusive on some
subjects, how can anyone reach positions concerning those subjects
on rational grounds alone? If all citizens must reach beyond what
can be established rationally, where are they to look? The answer
to these questions is that religious bases of decision cannot reasonably be disfavored in comparison with other nonrational bases for
decision.
To support this conclusion, I undertake a three-step analysis.
First, I explore in a little more detail how religious convictions figure into determinations about animal rights and environmental
protection. Second, I attempt the arduous task of distinguishing

77. See Brennan, The Moral Standing of Natural Objects, 6 ENvTL. ETmics 35, 40 (1984).
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between rational and nonrational judgments, and suggest that religious judgments should be treated as one kind of nonrational judgment. Third, and finally, I return to the position that reliance on
religious judgments is inappropriate, inquiring whether the position that citizens should rely exclusively on rational grounds, or
the position that religious grounds should be excluded even if
other nonrational grounds are not, is defensible; I conclude that a
persuasive defense of either of these positions is not possible.
A. Religious Convictions and Political Choice
Religious convictions of the kind familiar in this society bear
pervasively on ethical choices, including choices about laws and
government policies, in a rich variety of ways. Reliance on such
convictions would be inapt if the convictions themselves were
wrong or unhelpful, or if reliance on them were disqualified by
some underlying principle of liberal democracy. Because those who
urge that political decisions in a liberal society should be exclusively secular hope to establish their claim without tackling issues
of religious truth, the latter possibility is the critical one, and is the
main focus of the following analysis, although the analysis also
considers briefly the possibility that religious convictions are unhelpful because they merely replicate what is discoverable through
other means.
Exactly which beliefs and systems of beliefs are "religious" is a
perplexing topic, 78 but one that is of limited concern in this Article, which focuses mainly on Christian and Jewish beliefs that undoubtedly are aspects of religious viewpoints. Like most other major religions, Judaism and Christianity involve belief in a
transcendent reality, forms of worship and contemplation, experiences of the "Holy, '' 79 ideas of sacred authority, myths and doctrines that interpret reality, and social institutions that embody

78. See D. LITTLE & S. Twiss, COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS ETHICS 53-74 (1978); N. SMART,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 3-39 (1970); Greenawalt, Religion as a Constitutional Concept, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753 (1984).
79. See N. SMART, supra note 78, at 5, 6-7 (pointing out that contemplative mystical experience may not be captured well by the idea of experience of the "holy" because, although
both Christianity and Judaism embrace groups with mystical traditions, mystical experiences have figured less prominently in them than in Hinduism and Buddhism).
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the religion.8 0 Most importantly for the purposes of this analysis,
Christianity and Judaism, like most religions, embody ethical
teachings.
To say without more that a religion embodies ethical teachings is
to miss the various ways in which the connection between religious
conviction and ethical conclusion can arise. Obviously, an authoritative text can prescribe behavior. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Ten Commandments are the most striking example,
though various formulations of the "Golden Rule" in the Old and
New Testaments are at least as important for Christians. Rather
than behavior, the text may recommend attitudes of heart and
mind, such as injunctions to love one's neighbor or one's enemies.
It also may indicate something about goods worth attaining. Similar prescriptions and recommendations may come from acknowledged religious leaders, ranging from Popes to ordinary clergy, or
from organized church bodies.
Religions typically embrace broad perspectives about the nature
of human beings and society. These perspectives include not only
appraisals that are essentially factual, such as whether people are
intrinsically self-centered, but also visions that concern the "ultimate meaning" of human life and the place of mankind in the universe. Understandings about these matters affect ethical judgments
about how people should govern their lives and about the respect
that they owe to other people and nonhuman beings.
Other sources of ethical guidance can be found in the nature of
the religious object that is worshiped and in conceptions of the role
that a person properly occupies in relation to that object. The notion of God as Creator is an important one for Judaism and Christianity; whether one understands nature as being created by God
for humans or supposes that humans have a responsibility to God
to preserve this creation can gravely affect one's sense of the natural environment.
Finally, religions offer paths by which difficult ethical problems
can be addressed. Many Christians, for example, believe that
prayer is an avenue of direct inspiration about what they should
do. Many regard consultation with fellow believers or clergy as a
critical source of guidance.
80. See D. LirmE & S. Twiss, supra note 78, at 54-63; N. SMART, supra note 78, at 3-39.

1042

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1011

Typically, these various sources of religious insight into what one
should do are not seen as mutually exclusive alternatives but as
reinforcing or mutually correcting."' Various segments of the
Christian and Jewish traditions give them differing degrees of emphasis. Religious believers also differ widely in the degree of confidence they assign to ethical conclusions reached on religious
grounds. Those who believe in the inerrancy of scripture, papal infallibility, or the assurance of their own religious inspiration may
be certain that they are right on some subjects. Others strongly
doubt their ability to ascertain ethical truth, but still believe that
the religious perspective holds out an important means for highly
fallible creatures to try to understand what is right.
Not all religious convictions that affect ethical views and practices are relevant to determinations of what the law should be in a
liberal democracy. In the Christian tradition, the universal failure
of people to live up to ethical norms is understood as a sin against
God, requiring forgiveness and critically revealing human dependence on divine love. Disagreements about whether efforts to live
morally gain merit in God's eyes or are exclusively the fruit of a
divine grace already conferred reach to the heart of Christian faith,
but they also do not immediately concern the determination of
what constitutes correct behavior. Even when religious convictions
bear on correct ethical choice, they need not concern what the law
should be. The choice made by persons who rely on religious guidance to decide how much of their income should go to help the
starving, for example, has no direct bearing on public laws and
policies.
When these various connections between religion and ethics are
put aside, however, a connection remains that is of the utmost importance for the purposes of this analysis. Religious premises pervade people's views of social reality and the justifiability of human
actions in ways that can affect what people think the government
should do. A person who thinks that animals warrant the same
moral consideration as human beings, for example, is likely to
81. The idea of mutual correction is tricky in this context. A religious person does not
believe that the actions God actually inspired him through prayer to take would conflict
with the actions God actually instructed him through authoritative scripture to take. Instead, this idea recognizes that the fallibility of human receptivity generates the need for
reference to diverse sources.
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conclude that the government should give animals significant protection. If religious convictions properly are treated as irrelevant to
political choices, therefore, the reason cannot be that they have no
intrinsic bearing on such choices. Religious convictions should be
disregarded only if they are subject to some kind of disqualification or if they merely replicate truth that is discoverable on other
grounds.
Many religious persons believe that one can determine what is
morally right action without reference to religious truth. 2 Under
this view, understandings about ethics reached through religious
revelation in its various forms merely confirm understandings that
can be reached through reason and ethical intuition. For example,
in one of the best modern expositions of a natural law perspective,
John Finnis' Natural Law and Natural Rights,8 3 the author develops a comprehensive moral theory without reference to God, suggesting only in a final part of the book that the discovery of selfevident "goods" and moral truth points toward the existence of
4
God.
This confirmatory view of revelation is radically opposed to the
view that one's religious perspective critically affects the resolution
of virtually every moral question, a view that is at least approximated among fundamentalist Protestant groups that suppose that
people who are without salvation are nearly blind to moral truth,
incapable not only of doing but also of understanding what is morally right.8 5 Salvation becomes the dominant event in the moral as

82. See, e.g., Sweet, Natural Religion and Religious Liberty in America, 25 J. RELIGION
45 (1945).
83. J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
84. Id.; see J. FINNIs, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 110 (1983). The natural law view of St.
Augustine, which comes much closer to traditional Protestant views, is much more pessimistic about the power of reason. Though he recognized a basic moral law written on the hearts
of all individuals, St. Augustine thought that ignorance and misguided will had almost effaced that law, and that people are "so readily subject to vanity that [they] judge the false
for true, reject the true for false, and hold as uncertain what is actually certain." H. DEANE,
THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 61, 85-95 (1963).
85. Jonathan Edwards, the dominant figure in the Great Awakening of the eighteenth
century, said: "The least beam of the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face
of Jesus Christ is worth more than all the human knowledge that is taught in all the most
famous colleges and universities in the world." H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 5455 (1976); see also G. HUGHES, AUTHORITY IN MORALS 5-6 (1978). Compare A. MAcINTEE,
supra note 22, at 51-58.
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well as the religious life of believers; through religious inspiration
and the revelation of scripture, adherents come to understand
what is right and to do it.
An intermediate possibility is that ordinary human sentiments
and rational understanding can go a good distance toward settling
what is morally right but that on some important moral questions,
including some questions of justice and political morality, these
sources of insight are unhelpful or exhaust themselves. On these
occasions, one's resolution will depend on reference to religious
premises.
For people who believe that religious premises are always or frequently a source of ethical truth that is unavailable elsewhere, an
injunction to disregard these premises in political choices would be
an injunction to make decisions on the basis of only part of what
they regard as the relevant data.
Any idea that political choices should rest exclusively on nonreligious bases undoubtedly is in less severe tension with a view that
religiously based sources confirm what is otherwise discoverable
than it is with a view that these sources afford unique ethical insight. Only an extraordinary version of the confirmatory view, however, actually would be compatible with the claim that reliance
should not be placed on religious grounds. A brief exploration of
some possible variations of the position that revelation merely confirms what is discoverable by reason demonstrates why this is so.
Suppose that reason allows all people, without strenuous intellectual effort, to reach correct conclusions about every issue relevant to public law and policy, and that religious revelation either
repeats what is otherwise plainly evident or illuminates matters for
which the rationally establishable truth is clear once attention is
directed to them. For example, the scriptural commandment
against killing may be regarded as reinforcing a rationally derivable moral norm against murder, and the doctrine of original sin
may be viewed as a powerful account of people's intrinsic selfishness, a selfishness that could not be denied by anyone who
thoughtfully considered the facts of human history and human
psychology. If, with respect -to ethics, confirmation were the exclusive function of revelation, then any time a person took an ethical
position indicated by a religious revelation that person could point
to the independent rational grounds that dictated the position.

1986]

LIMITS OF RATIONALITY

1045

Though revelation might play some causal role in the development
of a person's positions, by alerting him to consider certain factors,
the person could state unambiguously that nonreligious grounds
fully support those positions.
If the confirmatory role of religious revelation were less modest,
however, with revelation actually being used to resolve uncertainties, people sometimes would rely on religious convictions in a way
that might be barred by any principle that religious grounds are
illegitimate bases for political decisions. One way in which religious
revelations might play a role involves the limits of ordinary human
capacities. Assume that many ethical questions, while yielding to
reasoned resolution, are quite complex. If this is the case, perhaps
most ordinary people are incapable of resolving these questions on
rational grounds. As Finnis has noted, some derivations from first
principles to moral norms require "wisdom, i.e., a reasonableness
not found in everyone or even in most people."8 Moreover, some
of the people who can resolve issues on nonreligious grounds with
enough effort may not have the time or inclination to make that
effort.
Among the people who are incapable of reasoning fully about the
complex questions or have not devoted the necessary effort, some
believe that religious bases give them answers.87 If these people
also believe in a confirmatory view of religious revelation, they believe that the positions they accept are correct on rational grounds,
but they do not understand on secular rational grounds why that is
so, and they are not able to defend their positions against the major competing positions on such grounds. They adopt the position
they hold on religious grounds, and they do not know what position they would accept if they abandoned the religious grounds.
Religious convictions, informed by scripture or by authoritative
church statements, thus can play a critical role in the formation of
political views of many people when the rational grounds for some
positions are not within comparatively easy grasp. This view, or

86. J. FINNIS, supra note 84, at 69.
87. This view might assume that religious sources could give easy and clear answers. Indeed, some religious people do believe that easy religious resolutions are available for some
issues. That belief is challenged in G. HUGHES, supra note 85, at 11-25. Even if religious
sources do not yield a clear answer, however, they may affect the believer's conclusion. See
id. at 92-94.
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something similar to it, may best represent the traditional Roman
Catholic position."8
A more subtle role for religious sources involves the inquiries
and conclusions of those who are most competent to resolve issues
on other grounds and who make the effort to do so. Some problems
may have rational solutions, but solutions that are hard to grasp
for anyone. Legal scholars, for example, often shift from thinking
that one answer to a problem is correct, to thinking that the choice
is a "toss-up" for which no correct answer is available, to thinking
that a contrary answer is correct. Even scholars committed to the
view that every legal problem has a rationally correct answer often
are uncertain what the answer is. If the same were true about ethical problems, persons who believe that religious revelations are
confirmatory of reason might attain a much higher degree of certainty about an answer than they otherwise would have, and they
might accept on the basis of revelation a position that conflicts
with a highly uncertain judgment reached on rational grounds. Of
course, people rarely have the psychological objectivity and selfawareness to know that what they firmly believe is correct on one
basis is something they would believe is probably wrong on another
basis. A principle of eschewing religious convictions, however,
would demand such an inquiry and occasionally would lead a person who is uncertain what is right to reject the position he thinks
is supported by religious revelation.
In some instances of decisions about laws and policies, the degree of certainty of moral judgment is itself important. People who
are highly uncertain about the correctness of their own positions
may be much less willing to impose them on others and much more
willing to accept some sort of compromise. A principle foreclosing

88. Basil Mitchell has noted:
[T]he Roman Catholic Church has regarded supernatural revelation as a moral
or practical necessity, although not a theoretical one, for knowing the Natural
Law without [an] admixture of error; so that neither in theory or in practice
does the doctrine of Natural Law, whatever its merits, provide a means of determining moral questions without reference to controversial religious claims.
B. MITCHELL, supra note 3, at 105; see also G. HUGHES, supra note 85, at 10 ("[E]ven in the
Catholic tradition, there are some moral theologians who hold in practice, if not in theory,
that revelation is essential for our understanding of ethics.")
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reliance on religious convictions also would foreclose any increments in the degree of certainty that these convictions provide.
Thus, even under most versions of the view that religious convictions and institutions merely confirm what is discoverable by
human reason, the barring of religious convictions would preclude
sources of insight with considerable practical significance. If the
principle that religious grounds of judgment are illegitimate for political choices within a liberal democracy were accepted, a very
high proportion of Christians and Jews, if they wanted to perform
as conscientious liberal citizens, would have to eschew religious
sources of insight that they otherwise would regard as relevant and
perhaps critically determinative on some issues.
B. The Limits of Rationality and Religious Morality
I suggested previously that the plausibility of the position that
liberal citizens should not rely on religious grounds of decision
rests on the possibility that reliance on rational grounds alone will
suffice. The examination of animal rights and environmental policy
introduced a deep skepticism about this possibility. Now, I want to
address the limits of rationality more generally and to consider
how the claim in favor of the exclusion of religious grounds might
try to meet those limits. A discussion of rational grounds also is
important in helping to elucidate why I place religious convictions
among a larger category of nonrational bases of judgment.
Examination of the power and boundaries of rational thought, of
course, is a deep and unending problem in philosophy and culture.89 This Article does not aim to make a fresh contribution to
that topic. Instead, it attempts to develop an approach to rationality that fits with the claim that grounds of political decision should
be exclusively rational. For that claim, the critical question seems
to be whether judgments can be based on reasons that can be articulated and that have intersubjective validity.
The clearest instances of rational judgments are ones that can be
justified to any competent and levelheaded observer. The proposition that logical deduction and empirical inquiry involve rational
thought and judgment is fairly straightforward. Some time ago, for
89. As Hilary Putnam said, "there is no neutral conception of rationality to which to

appeal." H.

PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY

136 (1981).
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example, my eight-year-old son had to determine the dollar value
of 5000 ordinary pennies. Though two adults initially informed
him that the answer was $500, fifty dollars was the rationally demonstrable correct answer, derivable from the meaning of dollars
and cents and the axioms of arithmetic. Once the answer was explained, any person of moderate intelligence would be irrational to
reject it. If someone asked a simple empirical question, such as,
"Did it rain here yesterday?", evidence would be forthcoming, typically the recollections of those who were present, that would yield
a rational answer. A person who concluded that rain had fallen
yesterday would be able to explain to another person the good reasons that led to that conclusion, and in ordinary instances the evidence would be so persuasive that reasonable people could not disagree about the conclusion.
What is the place of rationality in practical decisions about what
should be done? That question matters for lawmaking, and it leads
to more difficult terrain. Once certain premises are granted, some
practical decisions are the product of logic and factual inquiry. If a
broad rule is authoritative and accepted-for example, that persons under eighteen cannot vote-then the application of that rule
to a particular person, such as an individual who is sixteen years
old, can be derived logically. Judges thus make rational judgments
when they apply accepted rules to circumstances undoubtedly covered by those rules.
Simple evaluation of the means available to reach a desired end,
a form of empirical inquiry, also is within the domain of rational
judgment. When one determines which of several possible means
actually is capable of achieving a certain end, or which of several
efficacious means will be least costly, one makes judgments of fact.
Ideally, perhaps, such judgments should be made with a thorough
knowledge of all aspects of all alternatives, but in ordinary life
shortcuts usually are required. Given the need to make decisions in
reasonable time and with reasonable effort, people are rational to
proceed with something less than a full canvassing of the relevant
considerations."

90. See D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY FOR DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS
A SOCIAL PROCESS 69-81 (1963); Lindblom, Some Limitations on Rationality: A Comment,
in RATIONAL DECISION 224 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964).
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Most practical judgments are not reducible to purely factual issues, and therefore involve more than simple derivation. Often, a
direct choice among ends, or a choice between means that considers the harms and benefits of subsidiary effects as well as capacity
to achieve the immediate end, is needed. Such situations raise
starkly the degree of relevance of rationality for value judgments.
At least if rough agreement exists about the importance of various ends, rational judgments about value choices are possible. Rational thought about values involves canons of regularity, generality, and consistency. Some conceivable choices may be regarded as
outside the boundaries of rationality if they are at odds with
choices made in similar situations or if they promote a concededly
unimportant value at the expense of deeper values. Often, however, the correctness of value choices is not demonstrable beyond
question, even when agreement exists about important ends.
One reason for this inability to demonstrate conclusively the correctness of some value choices is that the alternatives and all their
implications rarely can be laid out systematically. A second reason
strikes more deeply at reasoning about conflicting values. Much
discourse in law and morality assumes that humans are able to
identify in context which arguments are stronger than others, even
though nothing that amounts to proof of their various strengths is
possible. As Rawls has said, when proof is not possible, one still
can hope, in the words of John Stuart Mill, to "present considerations capable of determining the intellect.""'
A critical question regarding rationality and value judgments is
the status of ultimate judgments of value. Before tackling that
question and exploring its relevance for the thesis that political decisions should rest on rational secular grounds, however, I consider
nonrational judgments and the reasons for placing religious convictions in that category.
What I mean by a nonrational judgment is a judgment grounded
to some extent on a crucial element that cannot be established rationally. Nonrational judgments often concern matters that are not
comfortably subject to rational conclusions. On other occasions, individuals may reach nonrational judgments on subjects that others

91. J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 125 (paraphrasing J.
1907)).

MILL, UTILITARIANISM

6-7 (15th ed.
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with more ability or time might be able to resolve rationally. A
nonrational judgment is not irrational. An irrational judgment is at
odds with rationality, contradicting a judgment that could be
reached with an appropriate effort on the basis of available information, 92 while, in contrast, a nonrational judgment does not contradict the conclusions of rational thought but reaches beyond
them in some way. Though talk of degrees of rationality and irrationality may capture nuances more precisely than these simple
categories, the basic distinctions among rationality, nonrationality,
and irrationality retain usefulness for the purposes of this analysis.
The most obvious sorts of nonrational judgments are those for
which one can assign no grounds other than a subjective reaction.
A judgment that vanilla ice cream tastes better than strawberry,
for example, is of this sort, if it is a judgment at all. Even if an
outsider could advance complex psychological reasons why someone preferred vanilla, these would not be rational grounds in the
relevant sense. Conceivably, as the roots of this preference were
revealed, the preference might shift, but the psychological reasons
for the preference would not constitute a basis for thinking one's
way to the preference. More critically, the psychological reasons
would lack an intersubjective dimension; they could not be employed to argue that differently constituted individuals must or
should prefer vanilla.
The analysis of a preference shared by everyone would be more
tricky. Suppose, for example, that everyone preferred the taste of
vanilla ice cream to the taste of castor oil. In this situation, one
might conclude that, in some sense, vanilla ice cream "objectively"
tastes better than castor oil, and therefore that people could make
a rational judgment that it is better tasting, even if the source of
evidence remained exclusively subjective preferences. One must be
careful, however, about what this "rational judgment" means. It
amounts to an assertion that, for undiscovered reasons, virtually
all people prefer vanilla ice cream.93 Perhaps the important point

92. The idea here is that a judgment is irrational not only if it contradicts facts or valid
arguments of which a person is aware but also if it contradicts facts or arguments of which
that person should be aware.
93. One might try to go beyond subjective sensations and discover physical characteristics
that lead people to find sweet tastes pleasant and castor oil unpleasant. See Children and
Food: How Eating Habits Are Formed, Int'l Herald Tribune, July 29, 1985, at 16, col. 1.
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for practical decision is that it is rational to act on the assumption
that vanilla ice cream tastes better. Someone might try to give a
vanilla flavor to castor oil, but no one would use castor oil to flavor
ice cream.
Perhaps one cannot even appropriately speak of an individual's
making a "judgment" when that individual decides to act upon
purely subjective preferences, but many other determinations
clearly do appear to be matters of judgment. Often people reach
decisions in some vague way based on their experiences or on some
sense of life's significance. People facing decisions occasionally assign reasons favoring each alternative, conclude that one alternative seems better, and nevertheless choose the other alternative because it "feels right." Assuming that a person making such a
decision is not simply surrendering to irrational feelings that he
recognizes as such, he may feel there are deeper reasons supporting
his choice, ones that he cannot articulate to himself, much less put
to others in a way that will persuade them that the choice was
right for him or that a similar choice would be right for them.
I do not suggest that for all purposes rationality necessarily requires an ability to explicate. If abilities to discern accurately are
the product of training and experience that would produce similar
abilities in other individuals, one may speak of a rational exercise
of those abilities even when the person involved cannot verbalize
standards of judgment.9 4 Regardless of how one characterizes these
decisions, however, other decisions often are made by people who
are unsure that differently constituted individuals faced with the
same choice would react similarly. Though these judgments may
well be regarded as deeply reasonable for the choosers, this Article
treats them as nonrational.

94. A noncontroversial example would be a person's identification of a voice over the tele-

phone, without being able to explain how that identification was reached. More controversially, experienced police officers sometimes assert an ability to know intuitively what movements are suspicious. One is inclined to suppose that these are rational judgments, despite
the inability of those who made them to explain the bases of their determinations, if the

determinations are shown after the fact to have a high degree of accuracy. The assumption
underlying this conclusion is that, if another person had similar contact with the person

whose voice is heard or had similar experience as a police officer, that other person would be
capable of making the same judgment. See H. PUTNAM, supra note 89, at 184 (denying that
public checkability is an aspect of rational belief).
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The preceding analysis suggests why I consider religious morality and religiously grounded moral judgments as nonrational: the
crucial premises underlying such judgments are not subject to rational or convincing interpersonal demonstration. Because this basic idea obscures and oversimplifies, however, it warrants
explication.
Any religious morality is likely to include many elements that
are found in secular moralities and that plausibly can lay claim to
being persuasively established on rational grounds. Judaism and
Christianity strongly condemn the unjustified taking of life or infliction of pain. With respect to beliefs such as these, religious revelation most straightforwardly may be seen as confirming what is
apparent to natural reason. Certain elements of religious morality,
therefore, may be establishable rationally, but these elements are
precisely those for which religious underpinnings are unnecessary
to establish their correctness. The elements of religious morality
that are nonrational are beliefs that owe their apparent force to a
particular religious perspective, but might have no force or a different force if only a secular rational analysis were undertaken. In
this sense, the force of religious morality rests on the power of the
religious perspective.
I assume that the power of a particular religious perspective itself is not one that can be settled by rational means. It is logically
possible that rationality could work in two steps here. For example, rational argument might establish the existence of a powerful
and morally beneficent God, and further rational argument, based,
for example, on miraculous occurrences, might establish the content of God's revelation to human beings. Doing what that revelation indicated then would be rational, 5 even though one could not
rationally ascertain independent reasons for doing the actions that
were called for.
Through the ages some people have believed that rational inquiry can establish important truths about religion, such as the existence of a benevolent, omnipotent Supreme Being. The competing view, which perhaps has dominated modern Protestant
thought, is that one cannot arrive at religious truth through

95. This conclusion does not consider the dilemma of how one establishes that God has
moral authority.
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rational, nonrevealed premises.96 The important point for the purpose of this analysis is that few, if any, major religious traditions
claim that their own particular view of revelation can be established for fallible men and women by exclusively rational means.
Even religious traditions with relatively ambitious claims for the
rational establishment of religious truth usually do not suppose
that reason shows the validity of the particular modes of revelation
on which moral conclusions are based.
That does not mean that claims of religious truth or of religious
morality are wholly beyond rational scrutiny. The latter are subject to the same tests of consistency and regularity that apply to
nonreligious moral views. What rational scrutiny of religious claims
amounts to is complex, but Ninian Smart has suggested a number
of bases for assessing a historical religion such as Judaism or
Christianity: (1) whether its historical claims are roughly in accord
with actual historical events; (2) whether the leaders of the faith
have been flagrantly unethical; (3) whether the elements of its
faith involve self-contradiction or an intolerable tension; (4)
whether acceptance of the faith produces the fruits that the faith
values; (5) whether the faith produces a deep and meaningful account of the problems of life that are hardest to explain; (6)
whether the founder and prophets had force and style; and (7)
whether the narratives of the faith have a solidity and aesthetic
coherence.9 7 All, or most, of these inquiries involve elements that
are subject to rational thought and discussion. But a person might
concede that a faith passes these tests reasonably well and still decide that its acceptance is not warranted. Belief in a religion requires something more.
Typically, unless one accepts a religion unthinkingly on the basis
of tradition, one must have a deep sense, grounded in personal experience, that the religious perspective conforms with one's own
sense of life and social existence. If one has not grown up within a
tradition, the religion must have an initial appeal that "speaks to
one's condition." If one is to accept the religion, one must have a
continuing sense that it illuminates life's possibilities and meaning.

96. See N. SMART, supra note 78, at 105.
97. See id. at 114-23. The second inquiry in this list is not circular if we assume some
basic moral premises against which to judge these leaders' lives.
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To take a Christian perspective, an account of life that emphasizes
love and redemption and puts Jesus in a position of central importance will be seen as giving a more persuasive interpretation of the
significance of the human condition than any other alternative. An
ethical perspective grounded in these premises might be seen as
similarly persuasive. This kind of deeper reason might support
claims of religious truth, but it is not fully interpersonal in the
manner of ordinary rational arguments. One reaches an impasse if
someone else's view of life makes such a perspective unappealing.
One recognizes, at least in a pluralist society, that people with essentially equivalent rational capacities may hold widely different
views about religious matters.
My previous discussion of the relation between individuals' religious convictions and ethical judgments and the various religiously
grounded sources of ethical judgments hints at the complexity of
the ways in which religious people decide issues of ethics. No
doubt, one standard for interpretation of authoritative texts, and
for acceptance or rejection of particular religiously grounded ethical positions, is what seems ethically compelling on other than religious grounds. One's ethical sense, therefore, affects not only what
general religious views one adopts, but also the manner in which
one takes the ethical implications of these views. If rational analysis plays a significant role in the development of ethical positions,
for some reasons already indicated and others to be identified
shortly, then rational secular morality for many people becomes a
kind of straining device and check on religiously grounded morality9 8 Still, this truth does not detract from the central point that
the power of religiously grounded sources of insight derives in part
from nonrational judgments. 99
98. See generally G. HUGHES, supra note 85.
99. Though I believe that religious truth and religious morality have crucial nonrational
elements, and the terminology used in this Article reflects that belief, this conclusion perhaps is not critical for the broader purposes of the Article. Suppose, for example, that someone believes that religious truth and all of the morality based on it are establishable by
convincing rational arguments. This person would have to concede that many people in existing liberal democracies do not accept the religious truth and morality that he believes are
rationally demonstrable. If rational secular grounds were available to resolve all political
issues, one could make a strong fairness argument in favor of relying on these grounds,
rather than the controversial religious grounds that presently are unshared and that are
believed nonrational by many and positively irrational by some. Thus, all that may be
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I now return to the important question of the relation between
rationality and the status of ultimate value judgments. There is a
strong, though always controversial, tradition in liberal philosophy
that treats ultimate value judgments as subjective. 100 That view
may seem to pose a substantial obstacle to the recommendation of
exclusive reliance on rational grounds for political decisions, because ultimate value judgments obviously figure in such decisions.
A proponent of rational secular grounds of decision might respond
by denying the premise that ultimate value judgments are subjective, or by claiming that critical nonrational judgments are settled
by one's culture, or by urging that political decisions can sidestep
debatable questions of ultimate value, or by advancing some combination of these approaches.
The first response takes head on the claim about the subjectivity
of values, asserting that the domain of objective value judgments is
much greater than supposed. As Isaiah Berlin has suggested, if
someone derived pleasure from sticking pins in people and displayed complete indifference to the pain this caused, most people
would conclude that the person was irrational. 10 1 Some value judgments, however derived, thus simply are associated with rational
persons. Perhaps, as John Finnis claims, fundamental truths are
self-evident to rational beings; 0 2 or, as Thomas Nagel suggests,
perhaps an individual's understanding of the meaning of being a
person among persons commits that individual to certain conclusions about values; 03 or, as R.M. Hare has argued, perhaps the nature of moral language implies a way to resolve value conflicts.104 A
view that was influential at the time of this country's founding,
and that finds modern expression in "intuitionism," is the idea
that people have a separate moral sense that tells them what is

needed for an argument in favor of rational secular grounds is a contention that religious
convictions are widely understood to rest on something beyond rationality, and not a contention that correct religious convictions actually do so.
100. See, e.g., Oppenheim, Rational Decisions and Intrinsic Valuations, in RATIONAL DECISION 217 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964).
101. Berlin, Rationality of Value Judgments, in RATIONAL DECISION 221 (C. Friedrich ed.
1964).
102. J. FINNIS, supra note 84, at 20-21.
103. See T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRuiSM 83-88 (1970).

104. R. HARE,

FREEDOM AND REASON

(1963).
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good and rightY'°5 Insofar as such a shared sense exists among
humans, the appropriateness of calling it "rational" may be debatable, but the conclusions indicated by this intuition certainly
would be an appropriate starting point for rational deliberations
on political issues. Much the same might be said if one conceded
that the starting point for morality and law is not a shared moral
sense but subjective desires, and claimed that people share the
same subjective desires. 10 6 Were ultimate desires and their personal ordering universal, in the way that a preference for vanilla
ice cream over castor oil may be universal, these desires could be
accorded a kind of objective status. Finally, some conclusions that
appear initially to be ultimate claims about values may be reined
in by canons of consistency as they apply to practical choice. As
intimated above, if a person had desires or ends that, if satisfied,
would defeat other desires or ends that are more important to that
person, one could say that the desires or ends were irrational because they would not fit within the pattern of what would best
107
serve the person's overall objectives.
This cursory canvass is barely a beginning for thinking about objectivity and rationality regarding values, but it illustrates how a
proponent of rational secular discourse might argue that judgments about good and right are much more objective, and much
more susceptible to rational judgment, than a full fledged subjectivist would admit.
A philosophically more modest response to this subjectivist
worry is the claim that particular cultures settle what is valuable
and what sorts of actions are right, and that these understandings
appropriately underlie political decisions. This approach may be
especially appealing to lawyers. The law may be viewed as embodying an immense number of judgments about values and resolutions of conflicts between them, and legal decisions in novel and
difficult cases may be understood as attempts to resolve particular
105. See G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 181-213 (1978). The basic idea is captured by
Thomas Jefferson's opinion that if you state "a moral case to a plowman and a professor"
the plowman "will decide it as well and often better than the [professor] because he has not
been led astray by artificial rules." H. MAY, supra note 85, at 296.
106. The writings of Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham represent this position.
107. John Rawls has written of utility as the satisfaction of rational desires. J. RAWLS,
supra note 5, at 22-27.
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problems in light of the rich materials of the law. This view of legal
decision, notably exemplified in the work of Ronald Dworkin, 108
might be extended more broadly to decisions about what the law
should be. Citizens and officials then would be drawing from the
rich materials of their culture to resolve novel problems, and the
value judgments they would appropriately deploy would be drawn
from the culture. Even if the culture's "choices" ultimately were
subjective in some sense, the fact that the culture adopted these
choices would be rationally determinable, and the explication and
application of these choices could be a part of rational secular discourse within the culture.
Neither the possibility of objectivity independent of culture nor
the possibility of objectivity rooted in culture is sufficient wholly to
dispel the worry about the status of ultimate values. Most modern
secular philosophers who have stressed the supracultural objectivity of many values and moral judgments have not supposed that
all judgments about values and right action have correct, rationally
determinable answers.10 9 Even if various ways of establishing objective values can circumscribe the domain of subjectivity, they
may not separately, or together, eliminate that domain. Though I
confess to deep uncertainty about the full reach of rational judgment, I do not believe that it embraces the entire domain of values. If it does not do so, then the dimensions of the problem raised
for the claim that political decisions should rest on rational secular
grounds may be reduced, but the problem is not eliminated.
Similar doubts may be expressed about whether, within a culture, any comprehensive ordering of values exists that could eliminate the domain of subjectivity. But here a sharper objection exists. Regardless of what may be true for officials, citizens are free
to urge and vote for measures that would represent a shift in prevailing values. No doubt citizens must communicate in terms that
other people understand, and to that extent their discourse must
connect to what people presently understand about values, but
they are free to urge that their society has badly misconceived

108. R.

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

(1977).

109. See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, supra note 22, at 8, 20; T. NAGEL, THE LIMITS OF OBJECTIVITY 135-36 (1979); H. PUTNAM, supra note 89, at 148; J. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 88; G. WARNOCK, supra note 32, at 28, 143-66.
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what really matters. A private citizen is not doing anything at odds
with the spirit of liberal democracy if he urges that the importance
of private property has been badly overvalued and that a society
presently committed to a substantial degree of private enterprise
should move peaceably toward social ownership of the means of
production. A private citizen would act within the spirit of liberal
democracy if his votes and other political actions were determined
by a desire to bring about that objective in the long run. Liberal
democracy does not preclude citizens from self-conscious rejection
of many accepted values and from efforts to have laws made that
1 10
would reflect other values.
A different response to the concern about the subjectivity of values is to concede its possible truth as far as ultimate values and
some moral questions are concerned, but to claim that this reality
need not compromise the rationality of political decisions. This is
essentially the approach that both Rawls and Ackerman have
taken. Rawls has asserted that people with very different life plans,
and ideas of the good, all will want liberties, opportunities, and
wealth. A theory of what is just, the theory relevant to political
decision, can be developed from this "thin theory of the good."
Ackerman's whole theory is built on the inappropriateness of political decisions that rest on any controversial assumptions about
what is valuable. Although Ackerman has advanced reasons why
people who believe in absolute values still should be liberals, his
comment that "[t]here is no moral meaning hidden in the bowels
of the universe""'
makes his own position about ultimate values
clear. His postulate of dialogue constrained by a principle of neutrality has been designed precisely to take many questions of ultimate value-at least all those that are involved in a person's conception of the good-out of the political arena. Like Rawls,
Ackerman has supposed that almost everybody wants the means to
accomplish their ideas of the good in their own lives, and that
these desires for wealth and power are a sufficient basis for reaching political decisions. Thus, these decisions can be made on

110. This observation, of course, is subject to whatever preclusion may exist upon promoting values of a particular sort.
111. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 368.
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rational and secular grounds even if many value assumptions are
not objective and are not establishable in any rational way.
The theories of Rawls and Ackerman undoubtedly rest on at
least some ultimate value assumptions, such as the assumption
that people in a society are owed equal respect and concern." 2
Granting the truth of this claim, however, does not undermine the
possibility that these theories would permit rational and secular
political decisions. Conceivably, the necessary premise of equality
could be drawn out of the nature of persons or moral concepts and
thus could be given an objective and rational status, but even if it
could not, this premise is an underlying foundation of liberal democracy. Regardless of whether this premise is more rational than
competing premises, a person could not reject it and still be a good
liberal democrat. This fact alone is sufficient to establish the egalitarian premise as a starting point for liberal democratic theory. If
all political decisions could be made with a combination of this
premise and rational and secular arguments, then the aspirations
of Rawls and Ackerman would be vindicated.
The examination of animal rights and environmental policy,
however, shows that the combination of essential liberal premises
and rational and secular arguments cannot resolve all political issues. The premises of liberal democracy are quite indeterminate
concerning the duties owed to other animals and to nature, and
rational argument is inconclusive; yet important political decisions
rest on how much consideration human beings should give to nonhuman entities. Any claim that reliance on religious grounds is always inappropriate, therefore, faces serious difficulties if it rests on
an assertion that people should rely exclusively upon rational and
secular grounds in making political choices.
V. THE APPROPRIATE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
Before drawing some final conclusions about the appropriate
place of religious convictions in political decisions, I summarize the
discussion thus far, and examine three possible strategies for resisting the thrust of the preceding analysis. The argument that
112. Ronald Dworkin proposed this assumption as the fundamental concept of Rawls'
deep theory. Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 50-51 (N. Daniels ed.
1975).
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members of a liberal democracy should rely as much as possible on
shared techniques for resolving issues has considerable appeal. It
suggests, correctly in my view, that reliance on rational, nonreligious grounds of decision is appropriate when those grounds yield
answers to the problems at hand. The examination of animal rights
and environmental policy, however, indicates that rational techniques do not establish how much consideration humans owe to
nonhuman entities, and thus leave unanswered critical questions
that bear on appropriate legal protection. Each citizen must resolve these questions on some nonrational basis. One such basis-a
basis that enjoys wide currency in this society-is religious
conviction.
If nonrational value judgments are needed to arrive at positions
regarding animal rights and environmental protection, a religious
believer has an extremely powerful argument in favor of his reliance on religiously informed views of the place of people in the
world, as he struggles with the relevant moral questions and their
political implications. Different religious traditions adopt radically
different perspectives on how human beings fit within the natural
environment, and if rational secular morality provides no evidently
correct perspective, it is hard to understand why a liberal democrat
should eschew deeply held religious premises in favor of alternative
nonrational assumptions that could yield a starting point.
A proponent of exclusive reliance on rational secular grounds
might pursue at least three strategies to resist this conclusion. The
first strategy would be to stick doggedly to the notion that good
citizens should try to think exclusively in rational, secular terms.
The proponent could claim that no moral or social problem exists
to which rational analysis is irrelevant. Indeed, this Article contains some nonreligious rational claims with respect to animal
rights and environmental policy. Although rational argument at
this stage of understanding admittedly might be inconclusive on
some critical questions, the proponent would argue that this inconclusiveness does not mean that rational argument fails to provide
answers in a relevant sense. As long as rational argument speaks to
one or both sides of an issue, a citizen should follow its indications
even if that argument leaves considerable doubt about the correct
answer. Although rational analysis leaves uncertain the answers to
many historical questions, one may act as if the most likely
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correct answer is the one supported by the strongest rational arguments, and one tentatively could adopt as correct the political decision that finds the most support in rational argument, even when
the arguments on either side are less than fully persuasive.
This strategy for claiming the exclusivity of rational and secular
arguments is unpersuasive for two different reasons. I shall assume
first that the picture in the previous paragraph is accurate, that on
every issue rational secular arguments have some bearing, and that
the arguments on one side always are at least slightly stronger than
the arguments on the other. Still, the assumption is that often the
arguments on one side may not seem much stronger than the arguments on the other, and the conscientious citizen may feel that
none of the arguments are particularly powerful. A citizen justifiably might conclude, therefore, that a great deal is left to be said on
a particular subject, and that what has been said so far indicates a
slight, but only a slight, probability that one particular side is correct. The same citizen may have religious convictions that establish
quite strongly the correctness of the other side. Suppose, for example, that Joseph's examination of rational arguments leads him to
suppose very weakly that human beings should not eat the flesh of
higher animals, and that the law should prohibit the production
and processing of meat for that purpose. In addition, suppose that
Joseph believes that the Bible reveals God's will for human beings
and clearly establishes the moral permissibility of eating meat. To
ask Joseph to disregard his firm convictions because they are religiously based, and to ask him to base his political actions on unconfident conclusions founded on uncompelling rational arguments, would be odd. It also would call for a discomforting split in
Joseph's grounds of assessment that would compromise the integrity of his whole personality.
This first strategy for claiming exclusivity of rational secular
grounds also is objectionable because it is founded on a misleading
picture of the typical relation between religious convictions and rational grounds. Although this strategy calls for a careful distinction
between religious and secular morality, many believers do not comprehend the distinct threads of these two types of thought. A religious person may believe that rational secular arguments have little to say on the issue at hand, but more often he will suppose that
they are fairly powerful, and that the rational secular arguments
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that fit with his religious convictions are correct. Identifying the
special role that the believer's religious convictions play in this situation would be particularly difficult both for the believer and for
others. This problem may make any effort to rely exclusively on
rational grounds very difficult for most people.
But this problem alone is comparatively minor and does not undermine the effort as an ideal. The major problem is that, even on
a careful reconstruction of many people's views, religious convictions are part of the groundwork against which rational arguments
are set. For Monica, an overall sense, drawn partly from the Bible,
of how humans relate to animals will form the perspective from
which she evaluates claims about meat eating. Monica may be incapable of imagining what alternative perspective she might adopt
if she disregarded her religious convictions. It is not as if she can
easily separate religious conviction from rational analysis; the two
are intermingled in the way she approaches complex social issues.
A second, different strategy for claiming the exclusivity of rational secular grounds moves toward the concession intimated during the treatment of the status of ultimate value judgments. The
concession is that nonrational grounds can count, but only if they
are part of a shared social consensus. Citizens can rely on premises
that are very widely held in the society, even if these premises are
not establishable rationally, but citizens cannot rely on controversial nonrational grounds.
Initially, one must inquire whether this proposal would be limited to reliance upon nonreligious grounds supported by a consensus, or whether it also would allow reliance upon religious grounds
supported by a consensus. Given widespread belief in God and in
certain premises of religious ethics-for example, that God loves
people equally-one cannot rule out the possibility that a consensus might exist concerning certain religiously grounded ethical
judgments. The argument that only a nonreligious consensus
should count would encounter grave difficulties. Many of the most
widely held ethical beliefs in our society have religious roots, and
to say that citizens could rely on them only when the religious underpinnings have faded from the consciousness of the individual or
the collective cultural mind would be odd. The more plausible version of this second strategy, therefore, would be one that permits
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reliance on consensus judgments even if those judgments have recognized religious elements.
The deeper difficulties with this consensus approach concern the
meaning and significance of the presence or absence of consensus.
Giving content to the idea that political positions must rest on a
consensus is difficult because so much depends on the level of generality at which the relevant ideas are cast. Let us assume that
rational secular argument cannot establish how much consideration humans owe animals. Suppose that Jennifer favors a legal ban
on certain forms of factory farming. This position could be cast in
at least three different ways. First, it could be cast as an attempt
to give specific application to an already existing consensus that
animals should not be made miserable to serve marginal human
interests. Second, it could be cast as opposed to an overwhelmingly
accepted view that factory farming does not amount to improper
behavior toward animals. Third, Jennifer's position could be understood as one not endorsed or rejected by any existing consensus
because the relatively few people who have been informed fully
about the facts of factory farming are deeply troubled about
whether it is proper. One position, therefore, can implicate more
than one statable consensus; they may be cast at different levels of
generality and in terms of differential degrees of acquaintance with
the facts.
The consensus approach also leaves a gaping hole for critical issues as to which no present consensus exists. The example concerning the moral opposition to factory farming, based on a nonrational judgment, again illustrates the point. Suppose that a
consensus initially exists that the interests of animals are not great
enough to warrant prohibition of factory farming, but that attitudes begin to shift and a consensus no longer exists. Must opponents of factory farming decline to change the law until their view
is supported by a consensus, such as the views of ninety-five percent of the population? If that were the case, factory farming
would continue until such a consensus condemns it. Suppose that
happens, and factory farming is outlawed, but that opinion then
starts to swing back. Do the proponents of factory farming have to
wait for a new consensus until they try to lift the prohibition?
These fanciful inquiries are enough to suggest the awkwardness of
the contention that people should be allowed to rely on
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nonrational values in making political decisions only if a present
consensus supports those values. That is not how liberal democracy works, or how it should work. Shared social views develop
over time through the pressing of positions that are not initially
shared by a majority. A suggestion that no position should be
taken unless it presently rests on a consensus or can be supported
by rational argument would unacceptably cramp the democratic
process.
The third, and final, strategy for excluding religious grounds of
decision would be to contend that nonrational and nonreligious
grounds are preferable to religious grounds. Although this position
would not be totally absurd, given historical instances of divisiveness on religious lines, it would be an extremely odd one for a society such as ours, in which most people are religious and in which
relations among people of different religious views have been
mainly peaceable. This strategy also runs into the previously mentioned difficulty of distinguishing religious grounds from nonrational nonreligious ones, many of which are rooted in the religious
pasts of individuals and cultures. In the late twentieth century
United States, therefore, no substantial argument supports the
contention that citizens who are permitted to rely on various sorts
of nonrational grounds should have to eschew religious convictions
of the sort that might bear on animal rights, environmental policy,
and other important issues.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although some governmental choices about animals and the environment may not impair the liberty of private citizens, many
protective legal rules do constrain the choices of those who own
and use animals and parts of the environment. Some individuals
who are constrained will take the human dominion view of nature,
believing that they have a moral right of exploitation for human
advantage. From their point of view, a regulation protecting animals or the environment infringes on their moral rights. On the
other hand, at least in the case of animal rights, a reverse choice in
favor of human dominion may also be understood by some people
as a violation of rights-the rights of the animals whose interests
are wrongfully denied protection.
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Society cannot avoid deciding the degree of protection to extend
to animals and other natural entities within its domain. Although a
decision to protect does not usually work a severe imposition on
those of differing views, the restraints that result when individuals
properly rely on their religious convictions in these matters might
curb liberty in a way that some people think is unjustifiable. Even
if these controversial constraints are enforced in a liberal democracy, reliance on religious convictions nevertheless is appropriate
because nonrational judgments about entities that deserve protection are unavoidable; and, given those judgments, the nature of the
protection is of a kind that is called for in terms of rational secular
objectives.
If conscientious religious citizens properly can rely on their religious convictions in deciding critical questions about animal rights
and environmental policy, then the premise that legislators properly can rely on citizens' views formed in this way, and that they
sometimes can develop their own political positions by a similar
process, are fairly short steps. The conclusion that legislation
adopted on such grounds does not offend the religion guarantees of
the Constitution is another fairly short step. Although the argument is not developed in this Article, I believe these steps are
warranted.
Any complete account of religious convictions and lawmaking
must address a wide range of political issues and the ways in which
views concerning them may be affected by religious premises, but
the arguments advanced in this Article are sufficient to cast grave
doubt on any broad and simple generalization that reliance on religious convictions is inappropriate in a liberal democracy.

